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Defending against Adversarial Attack towards
Deep Neural Networks via Collaborative
Multi-task Training
Derek Wang, Chaoran Li, Sheng Wen, Surya Nepal, and Yang Xiang
Abstract—Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples which contain imperceptible
perturbations. A series of defending methods, either proactive defence or reactive defence, have been proposed in the recent years.
However, most of the methods can only handle specific attacks. For example, proactive defending methods are invalid against grey-box
or white-box attack, while reactive defending methods are challenged by low-distortion adversarial examples or transferring adversarial
examples. This becomes a critical problem since a defender usually do not have the type of the attack as a priori knowledge. Moreover,
the two-pronged defence (e.g. MagNet), which takes the advantages of both proactive and reactive methods, has been reported as
broken under transferring attacks. To address this problem, this paper proposed a novel defensive framework based on collaborative
multi-task training, aiming at providing defence for different types of attacks. The proposed defence first encodes training labels into
label pairs and counters black-box attack leveraging adversarial training supervised by the encoded label pairs. The defence further
constructs a detector to identify and reject high-confidence adversarial examples that bypass the black-box defence. In addition, the
proposed collaborative architecture can prevent adversaries from finding valid adversarial examples when the defending strategy is
exposed. In the experiments, we evaluated our defence against four typical attacks onMNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. These four
attacks represent the state-of-the-art, which have been widely used in prior works. The results showed that our defending method
achieved up to 96.3% classification accuracy on black-box adversarial examples, and detected up to 98.7% of the high confidence
adversarial examples. It only decreased the model accuracy on benign example classification by 2.1% for the CIFAR10 dataset. As
far as we know, our method is a new two-pronged defence that is resilient to the transferring attack targeting MagNet.
Index Terms—Deep neural network, adversarial example, security.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
D EEP neural networks (DNNs) have achieved remark-able performance on various tasks, such as computer
vision, natural language processing and data generation.
However, DNNs are vulnerable towards adversarial attacks
which exploit imperceptibly perturbed examples to fool the
neural networks [38]. For instance, deliberately crafted ad-
versarial examples can easily deceive DNN-based systems
such as hand-writing recognition [32], face detection [21],
and autonomous vehicle [12], making the models generate
wrong outputs. The adversarial examples are even possible
to trigger catastrophic consequences, such as causing acci-
dent originated by faulty object detection in autonomous
vehicles [24]. Considering the blooming DNN-based appli-
cations in modern electronic systems, as well as it will likely
be in the future applications, proposing effective defensive
methods to defend DNNs against adversarial examples has
never been this urgent and critical.
Adversarial attacks against DNN-based systems can be
categorised into three types based on the a priori knowledge
that attackers have: 1) black-box attacks, 2) grey-box attacks,
and 3) white-box attacks. Currently, there are also a series of
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defending methods proposed, which can be broadly divided
into proactive defence (e.g. [6], [16], [34], [36]) and reactive
defence (e.g. [11], [14], [23], [29], [41]). However, they all
have limitations. Specifically, current countermeasures can
only counter attackers in specific scenarios.
For proactive defending methods, they focus on transfer-
ring attacks launched in black-box settings. However, they
do not work in grey-box and white-box scenarios since this
type of defence relies on model parameter regularisation
and robust optimisation to mitigate the effects of adversarial
examples. They become invalid once the parameters or the
defending strategies are known to attackers. Moreover, this
type of defence can be bypassed by using high-confidence
adversarial examples (e.g., Carlini&Wagner attack [5]), even
in black-box settings. This type of defence is also not re-
silient to the attacks that exploit input feature sensitivity
(e.g., Jacobian matrix based attacks [32]). Instead of pas-
sively strengthening models’ robustness, reactive defending
methods can capture adversarial examples that have higher
attacking confidence and distortion [11], [14], [23], [29], [41].
However, these methods have been demonstrated to be
vulnerable to specific transferring attacks [3].
In fact, the type of attack is usually unknown to the
defenders, making the selection of a proper defence very
challenging. We also cannot simply ensemble the above
defending methods together to form a general defence,
as attackers can compromise each defending method one
by one [17]. Magnet [28] provides a two-pronged defence
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that does not require too much a priori knowledge on the
type of the coming attack. However, this method has been
reported to be broken by transferring attack directed from
substitute autoencoders [4]. So far, there is no secure method
that resides with the advantages from both proactive and
reactive methods for a general defence.
In this paper, we propose a well-rounded defence that
not only increases the robustness of neural networks to
low-confidence transferring attacks, but also detects high-
confidence black-box/grey-box adversarial examples at a
high accuracy. Moreover, our proposed defence can prevent
an adversary from finding adversarial examples when the
defending strategy is known to the adversary. Our method
first introduces adversarial training with robust label pairs
to tackle black-box attack. Then it employs a multi-task
training technique to construct an adversarial example de-
tector. The proposed method is able to tackle both trans-
ferring attack launched in the black-box setting and the
adversarial example generation based on the targetedmodel
in the grey-box setting. The main contributions of the paper
are summarised as follows:
• We introduced a novel collaborative multi-task training
framework as a defence to invalidate transferring adver-
sarial examples;
• This defence uses data manifold information to detect high-
confidence adversarial examples crafted in grey-box/black-
box settings;
• The proposed defence can prevent an adversary from
searching valid adversarial examples using the targeted
model in grey-box settings;
• The proposed defence is resilient to the transferring attack
which breaks the previous two-pronged defence;
• We carry out both empirical and theoretical studies to
evaluate the proposed defence. The experimental results
demonstrate that our defence is effective against adver-
saries with different prior knowledge.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes
the state-of-the-art attacks and clarifies the problem state-
ment and our contributions. Section 3 presents our detailed
approach. Section 4 presents the evaluation of our approach.
Section 5 provides an analysis on the mechanism of the
defence. Section 6 presents a conclusion on the existing
attacks and the defensive methods. Section 7 discusses the
remaining unsolved problems of the existing attacks and
defences, as well as the possible further improvements of
the defence. Section 8 summaries the paper, and proposes
the future works.
2 PRIMER
2.1 Adversarial attacks
We first introduce the state-of-the-art attacks in the field.
Supposing the DNN model is equal to a non-convex func-
tion F . In general, given an image x along with the rightful
one-hot encoded label ytrue, an attacker searches for the
adversarial example xadv .
2.1.1 FGSM
Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) is able to generate adver-
sarial examples rapidly [13]. FGSM perturbs an image in the
image space towards gradient sign directions. FGSM can be
described using the following formula:
xadv ← x+ ǫsgn(▽xL(F (x), ytrue)) (1)
Herein L is the loss function (a cross-entropy function
is typically used to compute the loss). F (x) is the softmax
layer output from the model F . ǫ is a hyper-parameter
which controls the distortion level on the crafted image.
sgn is the sign function. FGSM only requires gradients to
be computed once. Thus, FGSM can craft large batches of
adversarial examples in a very short time.
2.1.2 IGS
Iterative gradient sign (IGS) attack perturbs pixels in each
iteration instead of a one-off perturbation [20]. In each
round, IGS perturbs the pixels towards the gradient sign
direction and clip the perturbation using a small value ǫ. The
adversarial example in the i-th iteration is stated as follows:
xiadv = x
i−1
adv − clipǫ(α · sgn(▽xL(F (x
i−1
adv), ytrue))) (2)
Compared to FGSM, IGS can produce an adversarial
example with a higher mis-classification confidence.
2.1.3 JSMA
Jacobian-based saliency matrix attack (JSMA) iteratively
perturbs important pixels defined by the Jacobian matrix
based on the model output and input features [32]. The
method first calculates the forward derivatives of the neural
network output with respect to the input example. The
adversarial saliency map demonstrates the most influential
pixels which should be perturbed. Based on two versions
of the saliency map, attacker can increase the value of
the influential pixels in each iteration to generate targeted
adversarial examples, or decrease pixel values to get non-
targeted examples.
2.1.4 Deepfool
Deepfool is able to generate adversarial examples with
minimum distortion on original images [30]. The basic idea
is to search for the closest decision boundary and then per-
turb x towards the decision boundary. Deepfool iteratively
perturbs x until x is misclassified. The modification on the
image in each iteration for binary classifier is calculated as
follows:
ri ← −
F (x)
‖ ▽F (x) ‖2
2
▽ F (x) (3)
Deepfool employs the linearity assumption of the neural
network to simplify the optimisation process. We use the
L∞ version of Deepfool in our evaluation.
2.1.5 Carlini&Wagner L2
This method has been reported to be able to make defen-
sive distillation invalid [5]. This study explored crafting
adversarial examples under three distance metrics (i.e. L0,
L2,and L∞) and seven modified objective functions. We use
Carlini&Wagner L2, which is based on the L2 metric, in
our experiment. The method first redesigns the optimisation
objective f(xadv) as follows:
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f(xadv) = max(max{Z(xadv)i : i 6= l} − Z(xadv)l,−κ)
(4)
where Z(xadv) is the output logits of the neural network,
and κ is a hyper-parameter for adjusting adversarial exam-
ple confidence at the cost of enlarging the distortion on the
adversarial image. Then, it adapts L-BFGS solver to solve
the box-constraint problem:
min
δ
‖δ|2
2
+ c · f(x+ δ)s.t. x+ δ ∈ [0, 1]n (5)
Herein x + δ = xadv . The optimisation variable is
changed to ω : δ = 1
2
tanh(ω) + 1 − x. According to the
results, this method has achieved 100% attacking success
rate on the distilled networks in a white-box setting. By
changing the confidence, this method can also have targeted
transferable examples to perform a black-box attack.
2.2 Threat model
We have three types of models for launching attack (i.e.
black-box, grey-box, and white-box). In the real-world cases,
the adversary normally do not have the parameters or the
architecture of a deep learning model, since the model is
well-protected by the service provider. Therefore, in our first
threat model, we mainly assume that the adversary is in
black-box setting. In prior works [3], [5], it is recommended
that the robustness of a model should be evaluated by
transferring adversarial examples. Otherwise, attackers can
use an easy-to-attack model as a substitute to break the
defence on the oracle model. Second, in some cases, the
architecture and parameters of the model, as well as the
defending mechanism, may be leaked to the attacker. This
leads to a grey-box scenario. However, the adversary does
not know the parameters of the defence. In an extreme
case of white-box scenario, the adversary knows everything
about the oracle model and the defence. This is a very strong
assumption. Attacks launched in this way are nearly impos-
sible to defend since the attacker can take countermeasure
for defence. Therefore, we mainly consider black-box and
grey-box threats in our work. We list the mentioned threat
types as follows:
• Black-box threat: the attacker does not know the pa-
rameters and architecture of the target model. How-
ever, the attacker can train an easy-to-attack model
as an substitute to craft adversarial examples, and
transfer the examples onto the target classifier (i.e.
the oracle). The attacker also has a training dataset
which has the same distribution with the dataset
used to train the oracle. To simulate the worst yet
practical case that could happen in the real world,
the substitute and the oracle are trained using the
same training dataset. However, the attacker knows
neither the defensive mechanism, nor the exact archi-
tecture and parameters of the oracle.
• Grey-box threat: an attacker knows the parameters
and the architecture of the oracle, as well as the
adopted defending method. In this case, the attacker
is able to craft adversarial examples based on the
oracle instead of the substitute. However, because the
parameters of the defensive mechanism are hidden
from the attacker, the defence might still be effective.
In our work, we assume that the defender has no a priori
knowledge pertaining to any of the following questions: 1)
What attacking method will be adopted by the attacker; 2)
What substitute will be used by the attacker.
3 DESIGN
We introduce our multi-task adversarial training method
in this section. The intuition behind our defence is that: 1)
Our defence framework grows an auxiliary output from the
original model. It detects adversarial example by checking
the pairwise relationship of the original output and the aux-
iliary output against the encoded label pairs. 2) The frame-
work learns smooth decision surfaces for the original out-
put, and steep decision surfaces for the auxiliary output. 3)
The smooth manifold for the original output mitigates trans-
ferred black-box attack, while the steep manifold learned for
the auxiliary output ensures that adversarial example can
be detected. 4) The collaborative learning between the two
outputs increases the difficulty for generating adversarial
example when the attacker searches adversarial example
based on the attacked model using adversarial gradients.
To better encode the label pairs for the original output and
the auxiliary output, we first examine the vulnerability of
the learnt decision surfaces in a neural network model, such
that we can later encode label pairs based on the identified
vulnerable decision boundaries. Based on the encoded label
pairs, we introduce our collaborative multi-task training
framework for both black-box attack and grey-box attack.
3.1 Vulnerable decision surface
In this section, given the original data examples of a class,
we identify the corresponding adversarial target class that is
usually employed by an adversary. We name the model de-
cision boundary between the original class and the targeted
class as the vulnerable decision surface.
A main constraint imposed on adversarial example is the
distortion between the perturbed example and the original
example. In the case of non-targeted attack, by using gradi-
ent descent to search for adversarial example, the attacker
aims to maximise the error of the classification with minimal
changes on the example in the feature space. Assuming we
have a dataset D and a model F trained on D, the decision
surfaces of F will separate data points belonging to different
classes in D. According to some previous works, we can
find out that, given an example belonging to a certain
class, it is easier to target the example to specific classes
for the attacker [5]. This implies that the vulnerable extent
of the decision surfaces varies. However, due to the high
dimensionality of the features, the vulnerability cannot be
measured based on simple metrics (e.g. Euclidean distance).
Herein, we adopt empirical analysis to effectively mea-
sure the vulnerability of decision boundary. Given the data
examples in class i, we empirically find out the probability
of i being misclassified into another class j. Specifically, we
use Eq.6 to estimate a confidence vector pi:
pi =
1
Ni
Ni∑
n=0
F (xiadv) (6)
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Fig. 1. The multi-task training framework. The training objectives are that, when the incoming input is benign, the outputs from Ytrue and Yrobust will
match the pairwise relationship between different classes; When the input is adversarial, the output from Ytrue stays the same, while the outputs
from Yrobust will be changed. From another perspective, the output loss with respect to the feature modification is smooth for Ytrue, and is steep for
Yrobust. Moreover, the The collaborative learning by adding a connection between Z and Z
′ further hardens the model against adversarial example
generation in grey-box settings.
, wherein, xiadv is an adversarial example which originally
belongs to class i. Ni is the number of examples in the class
i. F (xiadv) is an output confidence vector from the model.
pi yields the expectation of the confidence of an example
in i being classified into other classes. Therefore, for each
pair of classes, pi indicates how vulnerable is the learnt data
manifold between them.
3.2 Encode labels into label pairs
Following the above method of vulnerability estimation,
we encode labels of the classes in the training dataset to
label pairs. To carry out the empirical analysis, we use non-
targeted FGSM to generate a set of adversarial examples
based on the training dataset. The generated adversarial
example set Xadv is then fed into the model to get the
observation. In the classification results, for a given output
label litrue indicating class i, we search the corresponding
pairing output label lirobust based on minimising the follow-
ing likelihood from the observation on:
lirobust = argmin pi (7)
Based on the observation on pi, we select the least likely
class being misclassified into as the robust label. Following
this procedure, we encode the paired-label for each example
in the training dataset. The encoding rules between lirobust
and litrue are saved as a table Classmap. In the grey-box
setting, this information will be used to access the credibility
of an input example.
3.3 Collaborative multi-task training
We propose a collaborative multi-task training framework
in this section. We consider both black-box and grey-box at-
tacks. The proposed general training framework is depicted
in Fig.1. The framework is trained under a multi-task objec-
tive function, which is designed to maximise the divergence
between the outputs of adversarial input and benign input.
The training process also integrates adversarial gradients
in the objective function to regularise the model to defend
against Transferring attack.
3.3.1 Multi-task training for black-box attack
According to the label-pair construction method discussed
in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, we use the robust label-
pairs to conduct the multi-task training [10]. Assuming the
original model has the logits layer that has outputs Z . Our
method grows another logits layer that outputs logits Z ′
from the last hidden layer. While the softmaxed Z is used
to calculate the loss of the model output with the true label
ytrue of the input x. The softmax output of Z
′ is employed to
calculate the model output loss with the robust label yrobust
when ytrue is given. We also use adversarial examples to
regularise the model against adversarial inputs during the
training session. The overall objective cost function Jobj of
training takes the following form:
Jobj =αJ(x, ytrue) + βJ(xadv, ytrue)) (8)
+ γJ ′(x, xadv, yrobust)
wherein, x is the benign example. We use adversarial gradi-
ents to regularise the model. xadv is the adversarial example
produced by the adversarial gradient in the current step.
ytrue is the ground truth label of x, and yrobust is the most
robust label of the current ytrue. J is the cross-entropy cost.
α, β, and γ are weights adding up to 1.
The first term of the objective function decides the per-
formance of the original model F on benign examples. The
second term is an adversarial term taking in the adversarial
gradients to regularise the training. The last term moves the
decision boundaries towards the most robust class with re-
spect to the current class. As discussed in [13], to effectively
use adversarial gradients to regularise the model training,
we set α = β = 0.4, and set γ = 0.2. The cost function
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J ′ is the average over the costs on benign examples and
adversarial examples:
J ′(x, xadv, yrobust) =
1
2
{J(x, yrobust) + J(xadv, yrobust)}
(9)
wherein J(x, yrobust) is the cross-entropy cost, and
J(xadv, yrobust) is a negative cross-entropy cost function to
maximise the loss of the yrobust output, when the input is
adversarial.
Once an example is fed into the model, the output
through Z and Z ′ will be checked against the Classmap.
The example will be recognised as adversarial if the outputs
have no match in Classmap. Otherwise, it is a benign
example, and the output through Z is then accepted as the
classification result.
In the grey-box setting, the attacker does not know the
existence of the defence, the adversarial objective function
will only adjust x to produce an example that only changes
the output through Z to the adversarial class. However, it
cannot guarantee that the output through Z ′ has the correct
encoding rule to the output through Z in the Classmap.
The grey-box attack is then detected by our architecture.
3.3.2 Breaking black-box defence in grey-box settings
In the grey-box setting, the adversary has access to the
model weights and the defensive mechanism. Therefore,
adversarial examples can still be crafted against the model
under the black-box/grey-box defence.
In the black-box/grey-box setting, if the attacker does
not know the existence of the defence, the adversarial ob-
jective function will only adjust x to produce an example
that only changes the output through Z to the adversar-
ial class, but cannot guarantee that the output through
Z ′ has the correct mapping relationship to the output
through Z , according to the Classmap. However, in the
grey-box setting, when the adversary performs adversarial
searching for targeted adversarial examples on the model
without the connection g, the optimisation solver can find
a solution by back-propagating a combined loss function
L(Z(x), Z ′(x), t, t′) as follows:
L(Z(x), Z ′(x), t, t′) = η1L1(Z(x), t)+η2L2(Z
′(x), t′) (10)
wherein t is the targeted output from Z , t′ is the targeted
output from Z ′. t and t′ should be a pair in the Classmap.
In this paper, we assume that the attacker can feed a
large number of adversarial examples through the protected
model and find out the paired t′ for each t. This is a very
strong assumption even in the grey-box setting. η1 and η2
can be set by the attacker to control the convergence of the
solver. The gradients for back-propagating the adversarial
loss from logits layer Z and Z ′ then become:
∂L(Z(x), Z ′(x), t, t′)
∂x
= η1 ·
∂L1(Z(x), t)
∂Z(x)
∂Z(x)
∂x
+
η2 ·
∂L2(Z
′(x), t′)
∂Z ′(x)
∂Z ′(x)
∂x
(11)
Therefore, it can be observed that the solver can still find
an adversarial example by using a simple linear combina-
tion of the adversarial losses in the objective functions, in the
grey-box setting. The detection method used for grey-box
attack corrupts in this case. To solve the grey-box defence
problem, we introduce a collaborative architecture into the
framework.
3.3.3 Collaborative training for grey-box attack
We develop a framework that not only defends against
transferring black-box attacks but also stops generating ad-
versarial example using the oracle, in which the adversary
has a priori knowledge of both the model and the defending
strategy.
We add a gradient lock unit g, between logits Z and
logits Z ′. The g contains two fully connected layers. This
architecture is not necessary, but we added it so that Z and
Z ′ retain a non-linear relationship. The last layer of g is
a multiplier, which multiplies Z with the output of g in an
element-wise manner to form a new logits Z∗. The input of g
is Z ′. The architecture is then trained using a benign training
dataset and regularised by a FGSM adversarial gradient, in
the same training process which is used in Section 3.3.1.
The added extra layers contain no parameter to be
trained; however it prolongs the path for computing ad-
versarial gradient. After the gradient lock unit is added, the
gradients of the loss function become:
∂L(Z∗(x), Z ′(x), t, t′)
∂x
=η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂x
+
η2 ·
∂L2(Z
′(x), t′)
∂x
= η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z∗(x)
∂x
+ η2 ·
∂L2(Z
′(x), t′)
∂Z ′(x)
∂Z ′(x)
∂x
= η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂Z∗(x)
(
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z(x)
∂Z(x)
∂x
+
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z ′(x)
∂Z ′(x)
∂x
)+
η2 ·
∂L2(Z
′(x), t′)
∂Z ′(x)
∂Z ′(x)
∂x
= η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z(x)
∂Z(x)
∂x
+
{η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z ′(x)
+η2 ·
∂L2(Z
′(x), t′)
∂Z ′(x)
}
∂Z ′(x)
∂x
(12)
It can be seen in the second term that, the back prop-
agation from Z ′ to x and the back propagation from Z∗
to x are mutually affected by each other. The gradient
update is calculated based on Z and Z ′ in the previous step,
but it does not take the updates in the current step into
consideration. Therefore, it is difficult for the solver to find
a converged solution on x. For the gradient based solver,
it is hard to find a valid adversarial example based on this
architecture.
When the model is put into use, the outputs through
Z∗ and Z ′ will then be checked against the Classmap from
Section 3.2. If the outputs match the encoding relationship in
the Classmap, the output is credible. Otherwise, the input
example is identified as an adversarial example. Therefore,
our defending method is to detect and reject adversarial
examples. Furthermore, the regularised model output from
Z∗ can complement the detection module once there is a
mis-detection.
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TABLE 1
Model Architectures
Layer Type Oracles SCifar10 SMNIST
Convo+ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64 3×3×32
Convo+ReLU 3×3×32 3×3×64 3×3×32
Max Pooling 2×2 2×2 2×2
Dropout 0.2 - -
Convo+ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128 3×3×64
Convo+ReLU 3×3×64 3×3×128 3×3×64
Max Pooling 2×2 2×2 2×2
Dropout 0.2 - -
Convo+ReLU 3×3×128 - -
Convo+ReLU 3×3×128 - -
Max Pooling 2×2 - -
Dropout 0.2 - -
Fully Connected 512 256 200
Fully Connected - 256 200
Dropout 0.2 - -
Softmax 10 10 10
TABLE 2
Evaluation Datasets
Dataset FGSM IGS Deepfool C&WL2
MNIST 10,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
Cifar10 10,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we present the evaluation on our proposed
method on defending against the state-of-the-art attacking
methods. We first evaluate the robustness of our defence
against the FGSM, IGS, JSMA, and Deepfool, in black-box
setting. Then we evaluate the detection performance against
high-confidence C&W attack in black-box and grey-box
settings. We ran our experiments on a Windows server with
CUDA supported 11GB GPU memory, Intel i7 processor,
and 32G RAM. In the training of our multi-task model
and the evaluation of our defence against the fast gradient
based attack, we use our implementation of FGSM. For
Carlini&Wagner attack, we adopt the implementation from
their paper [5]. For other attacks, we employ the implemen-
tations provided in Foolbox [35].
4.1 Model, data, and attack
We have implemented one convolutional neural networks
architecture as an oracle. To simplify the evaluation, we used
the same architecture for the Cifar10 oracle, denoted as
OCIFAR10 and the MNIST oracle, denoted as OMNIST .
The architectures of the oracle model are depicted in Table
1.
We first evaluate our method in a black-box setting
against four state-of-the-art attacks, namely FGSM, IGS,
Deepfool, JSMA, and Carlini& Wagner L2. Then, we evalu-
ate our defence against the C&W attack in both black-box
and grey-box settings. We select the L2 version of the C&W
attacks here because it is fully differentiable. Compared
to L0 and L∞ attacks, it can find the optimal adversarial
examples in terms of leading to misclassification. In our
evaluation, we set ǫ = 0.1 in FGSM and IGS, in order to
transfer attack from the substitute to the oracle. For JSMA,
we set the maximumdistortion to 14.5%, andmodified pixel
intensity by 1 in each iteration. For C&W L2 attack, we
set the parameter κ to 40, as the setting used to break a
black-box distilled network in the original paper [5], pro-
ducing high-confidence adversarial examples. Later, we also
evaluate the performances of our defence under different κ
values.
For FGSM, in each evaluation session, we craft 10,000
adversarial examples as the adversarial test dataset. For
other attacks, considering their inherited nature of heavy
computational cost, we craft the adversarial examples of the
first 1,000 samples from MNIST dataset and CIFAR10
dataset. We summarise the sizes of all adversarial datasets
in Table 2. We do not evaluate the detection performance of
our defence in black-box setting, since it has been evaluated
in the more strict grey-box setting. However, we tested the
robustness of our defence against the transferring black-box
attack.
To better approximate the manifold learnt by the oracle
model, we feed the whole MNIST training dataset into
the MNIST substitute to train it. We do the same when
train the CIFAR10 substitute. Therefore, we end up having
two substitutes for the CIFAR10 classification task and
the MNIST classification task. These two substitutes have
achieved an equivalent performance with the models used
in the previous papers [5], [28], [34]. For the MNIST sub-
stitute, it achieved 99.4% classification accuracy on 10,000
test samples after it is trained. The trained CIFAR10 sub-
stitute achieved 78.6% accuracy on 10,000 CIFAR10 test
samples. The trained substitutes are named as SMNIST and
SCIFAR10. The architecture of the substitutes is summarised
in Table 1.
4.2 Defending low-confidence adversarial examples
We present the performance of our defence against low-
confidence transferring black-box adversarial examples in
this section. First, given SMNIST and SCIFAR10, we use the
above four attacks to craft adversarial sets whose sizes are
listed in Table 2. Then, we feed the mentioned adversarial
test sets into OMNIST and OCIFAR10, respectively. We
adopt a non-targeted version of each of the above attacks
since the non-targeted adversarial examples are much better
in terms of transferring between models.
Robustness towards adversarial examples is a critical
criterion to be assessed for the protected model. For a black-
box attack, we measured the robustness by investigating
the performance of our defence on tackling the typical
low-confidence black-box adversarial examples, which are
near the model decision boundaries. We feed adversarial
test sets into the protected model, and then we check the
classification accuracy of the label output through Z∗. The
results of the classification accuracy are demonstrated in
Table 3. It shows that the accuracy of CIFAR10 classifica-
tion is limited by the performance of the oracle OCIFAR10.
When we measured the accuracy of the output label of
the adversarial examples against the predicted labels of the
benign examples, the performances on the CIFAR10 task
matches that of theMNIST task (Table 3).
It can be found that, in all cases, our method has
improved the classification accuracy of the oracle, except
for C&W attack. The reason is that C&W attack can still
successfully bypass the black-box defence because the con-
fidence of the generated example is set to a very high
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TABLE 3
Classification Accuracy on Non-targeted Black-box Adversarial Examples
Model FGSM IGS Deepfool JSMA C&WL2
Black-box defence OMNIST Original 34.3% 35.4% 34.1% 40.8% 12.6%
Defended 96.2% 95.8% 96.3% 91.3% 12.6%
OCIFAR10 Original 61.6% 50.2% 63.8% 11.7% 8.9%
Defended 68.6% 62.5% 71.3% 52.7% 10.0%
value (i.e. κ = 40). The nature of the black-box defence
is to regularise the position of the decision boundary of
the model, such that adversarial examples near the decision
boundary will become invalid. However, the defence can be
easily bypassed if we can adjust the level of the perturbation
or the adversarial confidence to become higher, to which
C&W is fully capable. This vulnerability also suggests that
we need a more effective defence for C&W attack. Later
on, we presented the results of our detection-based defence
which tackles the C&W attack.
4.3 Defending high-confidence adversarial examples
We evaluate our defence against high-confidence adversar-
ial examples crafted by C&W attack in this section. The
attacking confidence of adversarial examples from C&W
attack is changeable through adjusting the hyper-parameter
κ in the adversarial objective function. Large κ value will
lead to producing a high-confidence adversarial example.
Therefore, C&W attack can even achieve remarkable attack-
ing performance through transferring attack in black-box
setting. Therefore, our defence relies on detection mecha-
nism to tackle high-confidence C&W attack. We evaluate the
adversarial example detection performance against C&W
examples crafted using different κ values in the black-box
setting.
4.3.1 Defending transferring C&W adversarial examples
In a black-box setting, the high-confidence C&W examples
can transfer from the substitute to the oracle. We test the
defence performance of proactively invalidating adversarial
examples.
To demonstrate the performance, we measure the suc-
cess rates of the transferring attacks which change the
output results from the Z∗. The successful transfer rate
from the substitutes to the oracles are plotted in Fig.2.
When κ is set to a high value, the adversarial example
can still successfully break our black-box version defence,
since the nature of our black-box defence is similar to the
adversarial training. It regularises the decision boundaries
of the original oracle, to invalidate the adversarial examples
near the decision boundaries. But unfortunately, the high-
confidence examples are usually far away from the decision
boundaries. Therefore, we defend the high-confidence ad-
versarial examples by reactively detecting them. However,
compared to the unprotected oracle. our proactive defence
can keep the attacking success rate stays below 20%when κ
is less than 10.
4.3.2 Detecting high-confidence adversarial examples
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our method
on detecting the C&W attack in a normal black-box setting
Fig. 2. The rate of successful transferred adversarial examples by C&W
attack, in black-box setting. Our black-box defence decreased the suc-
cess attack rate when κ is under 10. However, when κ became higher,
the black-box defence turned out to be invalid.
and in the worst case of black-box settings. For each κ
value, we craft 1,000 adversarial examples. We then mix
1,000 benign examples into each group of 1,000 adversarial
examples to form the evaluation datasets for different κ
values. We measure the precision and the recall of our
defence on detecting the examples. The precision is calcu-
lated as the percentage of the genuine adversarial examples
in the examples detected as adversarial. The recall is the
percentage of adversarial examples detected from the set of
adversarial examples.
In a normal black-box setting, the substitute model is
not exactly the same as the oracle model. In this case, we
employed the substituteSMNIST and SCIFAR10 to generate
C&W examples. We evaluated the precision and the recall
on detecting black-box adversarial examples crafted under
different κ values. The precision values and the recall val-
ues are plotted in Fig.3. Our defence achieved above 95%
detection precision on MNIST adversarial examples and
above 75% detection precision on CIFAR10 adversarial
examples. At the same time, the detection recall values on
detecting MNIST adversarial examples are above 80%.
And the recall values on detecting CIFAR10 adversarial
examples are above 95%. Moreover, the precision and recall
are robust to the changing κ value.
To further increase the difficulty for defence, we evalu-
ated our detection defence in the worst case of black-box
settings. In the worst case, the attacker has a substitute
model whose parameters are exactly the same as that of the
oracle model. In this case, the adversarial examples cannot
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Fig. 3. The precision and recall of detecting C&W adversarial examples
in a normal black-box setting.
Fig. 4. The precision and the recall of detecting C&W adversarial
examples in the worst case of black-box settings.
be invalidated by proactive defence. We set the parameters
of the substitute to be the same as that of the oracle model
with proactive defence (without the Z ′ output), and κ was
varied from 0 to 40 to generate adversarial examples based
on this substitute.
The precision and recall values are plotted in Fig.4. It can
be observed that our defence method still has achieved high
precision and recall in the worst case of black-box settings.
The detection performance is robust to the varying attacking
confidence.
4.4 Tackling grey-box attacks
We evaluate the performance of our defence against grey-
box attacks. We evaluate our defence against the C&W
attack in this section since C&W can produce the best at-
tacking result, and is flexible in searching adversarial exam-
ples due to the tunable κ hyper-parameter. The adversarial
examples used in the evaluation are crafted based on the
linearly-combined adversarial loss functions mentioned in
Section 3.3.2. To measure the grey-box defence, we sweep
the value of κ from 0 to 40, and then we examine the rate of
successful adversarial image generation given 100MNIST
images under each κ value. We record the successful gener-
ation rate of targeted and non-targetedMNIST adversarial
examples based on the defended oracle. For targeted attack,
we randomly set the target label during the generation
process. The generation rates are recorded in Table.4.
It can be found that the rate of finding valid adversarial
examples is kept at a reasonably low level, especially when
the values of κ are high. Some of the generated C&W ad-
versarial examples with/without our defence are displayed
in the appendix in our supplementary file.
4.5 Trade-off on benign examples
We also evaluate the trade-off on normal example classifi-
cation and the false positive detection rate when the input
examples are benign.
First, we evaluate the accuracy of the classification re-
sults output through Z∗, after our protections are applied
on the oracle. We use both CIFAR10 dataset andMNIST
dataset in the evaluation. For each dataset, we draw 10,000
benign examples and feed them into the defended oracles.
The results are in Table.5. The classification accuracy of the
protected model is the accuracy of the output classification
label through Z , given the set of correctly identified normal
examples. It can be found that for the MNIST oracle,
our defence had no decrease on the classification accuracy.
On CIFAR10 task, our defence decreases the accuracy by
2.1%. The trade-offs are within the acceptable range consid-
ering the improvements on defending adversarial examples.
Next, we assess the mis-detection rate of our defence.
We feed 10,000 benign MNIST examples and 10,000
CIFAR10 benign examples into the corresponding de-
fended oracles to check how many of them are incor-
rectly recognised as adversarial examples. Our method has
achieved 0.09% mis-detection rate on MNIST dataset. For
CIFAR10 dataset, our mis-detection rate is 3.92%. Our
detector had a very limited mis-detection rate for both
datasets. Hence, our detection-based defence can accurately
separate adversarial examples from benign examples.
5 JUSTIFICATION OF THE DEFENCE
In this section, we present the justification on the mechanism
of our defence on both black-box and C&W attacks.
5.1 Classmap evaluation
We evaluate the generalisation of the Classmap extracted
from different attacking examples. We generate Classmaps
from FGSM, IGS, Deepfool, and C&W example sets. The
heat maps of the Classmaps are displayed in Fig.5. All
the Classmaps share a similar pattern. This means the
Classmaps learned from the first-order FGSM examples
can generalise to other types of adversarial example. The
generalisation of the Classmap ensures that the detection
mechanism can generalise across different attacks.
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TABLE 4
The Successful Generation Rate of C&W Attack in grey-box Setting
Attack Model κ = 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Non-targeted Original 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Defended 8% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Targeted Original 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 98% 96% 92% 90%
Defended 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fig. 5. The misclassification class map of FGSM, IGS, Deepfool, JSMA, and high confidence C&W examples. It can be found that all the classmaps
share a similar pattern.
TABLE 5
The classification accuracy on benign examples
Oracle Defended
MNIST 99.4% 99.4%
CIFAR10 78.6% 76.5%
5.2 Defending low-confidence black-box attack
For a black-box attack, the adversarial training introduced
in this model can effectively regularises the decision bound-
aries of the model to tackle adversarial examples near
the decision boundaries. Compare to vanilla adversarial
training [38], our method can further increase the distance
required for moving adversarial examples. Crafting adver-
sarial examples based on deep neural network leverages
back-propagation of objective loss to adjust the input pixel
values. Hence, the adversary is actually moving the data
point in the feature space according to the gradient direction
▽xadvL(xadv, y) to maximise the adversarial loss L (a non-
targeted attack in a black-box setting). Supposing the adver-
sarial example is found after n steps of gradient decent, for
each step of gradient decent, we have a step size α, the total
perturbation can be approximately calculated as:
δ = xn − x0 = α · (▽xn−1L
n−1 +▽xn−2L
n−2
+ . . .+▽x1L
1 +▽x0L
0)
(13)
According to Section 3.2, the adversary relies on the gra-
dient decent based updates to gradually perturb image until
it becomes adversarial. In the non-targeted attack, the search
will stop when an adversarial example is found. Given an
example whose original label is l, it is unlikely to classify
it into the robust label lr . In other words, within certain
steps, the gradient updates ▽xiJ
i will not converge if the
adversarial cost J is calculated based on the output that is
maximised at l and the robust target lr (or vice versa). Sim-
ilarly, in the targeted attacks, lr is more difficult to be used
as the adversarial target label. Supposing the total efforts for
maxmising/minimising L(x : F (x) = l, li : i 6= r) is δi, the
total efforts for maxmising/minimising L(x : F (x) = l, lr)
is δr ,we have δr > δi. When the training objective includes a
term that contains the robust label yrobust, the output of the
trainedmodel could be treated as a linear combination of the
outputs trained from l and lr. Therefore, the required total
efforts for changing the combined output becomes higher.
From the perspective of a classifier decision boundary,
our multi-task training method has also increased the ro-
bustness of the model against black-box examples. The
robust label regularisation term actually moves the decision
boundary towards the robust class (refer to Fig.6). Com-
pared to the traditional adversarial training, which tunes
the decision boundary depending merely on the generated
adversarial data points, our regularisation further enhances
the robustness of the model towards nearby adversarial
examples.
5.3 Defending the C&W attack
We provide a brief analysis on why our method can defend
the C&W attack here. A C&W attack mainly relies on
the modified objective function to search for adversarial
examples, given the logits from the model. By observing
the objective function f(xadv) = max(max{Z(xadv)i : i 6=
l} − Z(xadv)l,−κ), we can find out that the objective is
actually to increase the value of the logits corresponding
to the desired l class, until the difference between l class
and the second-to-the-largest class reaches the upper bound
defined by κ. The optimisation process can be interpreted as
adjusting the input pixels along the direction of the gradient
that maximises the logits difference.
In a black-box setting, when we adopt the collaborative
multi-task training as a defence, the model actually modifies
the output logits to have high outputs not only on the
position corresponding to the ground truth class, but also on
the position corresponding to the robust class of the current
ground truth. In the black-box setting, the defence is hidden
from the attacker. The attacker crafts adversarial examples
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solely based on the oracle model without the robust logits
branch. Hence, the adversarial objective function is not
a linear combination of L(Z(x), t) and L(Z(x), t′), but a
single loss L(Z(x), t). The crafted adversarial example can
only modify the output from Z to the adversarial target
t, but the output through Z ′ is not guaranteed to be the
corresponding robust label of t in the Classmap.
In a grey-box setting, the defending strategy is exposed
to the adversary. Therefore, the adversary can first query the
oracle model by feeding a certain volume of data examples
to find the approximate Classmap. Then, the attacker can
set the adversarial objective to a linear combination form
mentioned in Section 3.3.2 to successfully bypass the de-
fence. However, after the gradient lock unit is added, the
path for back-propagating adversarial loss becomes longer.
The solver cannot effectively adjust the input pixel values of
the original example due to vanishing gradients1. Second,
the two logits outputs (i.e. Z and Z ′) are related to each
other in the gradient back-propagation. Based on the last
step of gradient update, the adjustments made on Z and Z ′
become:
δz = η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z(x)
∂Z(x)
∂x
+
{η1 ·
∂L1(Z
∗(x), t)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z∗(x)
∂Z ′(x)
+η2 ·
∂L2(Z
′(x), t′)
∂Z ′(x)
}
∂Z ′(x)
∂x
(14)
However, the updates on Z and Z ′ are based on the
previous values of Z ′ and Z . Eventually, the inputs will
actually decay the progress made by the gradient updates.
Therefore, it becomes difficult for the optimisation solver
to find a satisfactory solution that can generate adversarial
label and the correct paired robust label of the adversarial
label.
6 RELATED WORK
6.1 Attacking methods
Based on the method of generating adversarial example,
current attacking methods can be divided into optimisation
based attack and forward derivative based attack. Optimi-
sation based attack sets an adversarial objective function
and optimises the example feature to achieve the optimum.
FGSM uses a single gradient descent step to slightly per-
turbed the input example [13]. Subsequently, an iterative
gradient sign based method was proposed in [20]. L-BFGS
based attack optimises a box-constrained adversarial objec-
tive to find adversarial example [38]. Furthermore, a method
named DeepFool is proposed. DeepFool iteratively finds the
minimum perturbations of images [30]. Last but not the
least, Carlini&Wagner attack is proposed to optimise a spe-
cially designed adversarial loss to craft adversarial example
with changeable attacking confidence [5]. For the forward
derivative based attack, it is based on the Jacobian of the
model output with respect to each input feature. JSMA was
first proposed by Papernot et al. [33]. This method modifies
1. Note that our defending method relies on gradient masking, which
is not the best way of defence.Wewill improve our defence in the future
work.
 !"#$%& 
 &!$' 
 ($)*'!+#)' 
Benign example
Adversarial example
Fig. 6. The regularisation in a 2-dimension sample space. Embedding
the robust class yrobust in the loss function will further move the decision
boundary between ytrue and yrobust towards yrobust. The fractions of
the decision boundary that were not regularised by injecting adversarial
examples will get regularised. Thus, for black-box examples that are
near the decision boundary will be invalidated.
the most critical pixel according to the saliency map defined
by the model Jacobian.
To make adversarial examples more imperceptible for
human beings, there are methods using different distortion
metrics. For example, an image can be perturbed in HSV
color space to generate adversarial example [18]. Addition-
aly, an image can be rotated to be adversarial [9]. Beyond
the mentioned attacks, there are attacks modified towards
different systems. Adversarial examples have been designed
towards applications such as object detection and segmen-
tation [1], [2], [24], [40], reading comprehension [19], text
classification [8], and malware detection [15].
6.2 Defensive methods
Defensive methods can be broadly categorised into proac-
tive defence and reactive defence. In the category of proac-
tive defence, a model is trained to be robust towards ad-
versarial examples. the first defensive mechanism employs
simple adversarial training to enhance the robustness of
neural nets [38]. Other adversarial training based defensive
methods are published subsequently [25], [39]. Gu et al.
proposed a contractive neural network. The contractive net
solves the adversarial example problem by introducing a
smooth penalty on the neural network model based on Lip-
schitz condition [16]. Defensive distillation distils training
dataset with soft labels from a first neural net under a
modified softmax layer to train a second identical neural
net [34]. The soft labels enable more terms of the loss func-
tion to be computed in the back-propagation stage. In the
mean time, the modified softmax function ensures amplified
output from the logits layer. Parseval network is proposed
to constrain the weight matrices of the convolutional layers
and dense layers, such that the network becomes insensitive
to adversarial perturbation [6]. Furthermore, few papers
employ robust optimisation technique to train robust model
towards adversarial examples [27], [36]. Additionally, a de-
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fence enhances the model robustness by pruning activations
from network [7].
For most of the reactive defence methods, a second
model is adopted to detect examples with adversarial per-
turbation. For instance, Metzen et al. attached detectors on
the original model and trained it with adversarial example
[29]. Another method employs support vector machine to
classify the output from the high-level neural network layer
[23]. A statistical method is proposed to detect adversarial
example batch [14]. Lately, there is a detection method detect
adversarial example based on the local intrinsic dimen-
sionality of layer representations [26]. For other detection
methods, they align with the idea of observing the changes
of an example after applying a certain transformation on it
[28], [37], [41]. For example, MagNet relies on autoencoder
to reconstruct adversarial examples to normal example, and
detect adversarial example based on the reconstruction error
and output probability divergence [28].
7 DISCUSSION
Current attacks and defences are largely considered as
threat-model-dependent. For instance, as the state-of-the-
art defence, in defensive distillation is working in a grey-
box scenario, the attacker knows the parameters of the
distilled network, but does not know that the network is
trained with defensive distillation. Thus, when the attacker
crafts adversarial examples based on the distilled network,
the removed temperature from the softmax function will
lead to vanishing gradients while solving the adversarial
objective function. However, once the attacker understands
that the network is distilled, the defence can be easily
bypassed by adding a temperature into the softmax function
while solving the adversarial objective function. Moreover,
defensive distillation is invalid towards a black-box attack.
Adversarial examples crafted by an easy-to-attack substitute
could still be valid on a distilled network.
As the attacking methods based on gradient, except
C&W attack, are unable to attack distilled network in a
grey-box setting, a black-box attack launched using these
methods is more practical and harmful. This is why we
evaluated the performance of our defence in a black-box
setting. As a special case, the C&W attack claims that it
can break the defensive distillation in the white-box setting,
since it searches adversarial examples based on the logits
instead of the softmax outputs. Hence, the C&W attack can
bypass the vanishing gradient mechanism introduced by
defensive distillation on the softmax layer. However, having
access to the logits itself is a very strong assumption, which
actually defines a white-box attack. However, a substitute
can be used together with high confidence C&W attack to
bypass distilled network in a black-box setting.
There are many possible ways to enhance our method.
First, our method can be further improved by incorporating
randomness into the defence architecture. For example,
switching some of the model parameters based on a set of
pre-trained parameters might further increase the security
performance of the defence. Second, attacks employ forward
derivatives (e.g. JSMA [32]) in grey-box setting can still ef-
fectively find adversarial examples, since our defence essen-
tially tackles gradient-based adversarial example searching.
However, our defence is still functional towards black-box
JSMA examples due to the regularised training process. At
last, our grey-box defence is based on gradient masking.
This can be improved in our future work.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we proposed a novel defence against black-
box attack and grey-box attack on deep neural networks.
Importantly, our method is able to protect DNN classi-
fiers from the Carlini&Wagner attack, which is the most
advanced and relatively practical attack to date. We also
demonstrated through experiments that the performance
trade-off on normal example classification brought by our
defence is also acceptable.
As the shortcomings of our approach, first, the quality of
the Classmapwill directly affect the performance of the de-
tection rate for adversarial examples. We use a large volume
of non-targeted adversarial examples to approximate the
encoding rules between class labels. However, the quality
is affected by the employed attacking method. Second, in-
troducing randomness into the defence can further increase
the defence performance. Moreover, there could be better
option than multiplying the logits in the gradient lock unit.
These problems will be addressed in our future work.
DNN has achieved the state-of-the-art performance in
various tasks. However, compared to traditional machine
learning approaches, DNN also provides a practical strat-
egy for crafting adversarial examples, since the back-
propagation algorithm of DNN can be exploited by an
adversary as an effective pathway for searching adversarial
examples.
Current attacks and defences have not yet been exclu-
sively applied to the real-world systems built on DNN.
Previous studies have made attempts to attack online deep
learning service providers, such as Clarifi [22], Amazon
Machine Learning, MetaMind, and Google cloud predic-
tion API [31]. However, there is no reported instance of
attacking classifier embedded inside complex systems, such
as Nvidia Drive PX2. Successful attack on those systems
might require much more sophisticated pipeline of exploit-
ing vulnerability in system protocols, acquiring data stream,
and crafting/injecting adversarial examples. However, once
the pipeline is built, the potential damage it can deal with
would be fatal. This could be another direction for the future
works.
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Fig. 7. The adversarial MNIST images generated using non-targeted C&W attack when κ = 0. The first row and the third row are the original
images. The second row is the generated adversarial image based on the original model (classification results are as the labels below the second
row). The fourth row is the failed generation after applying our defence on the model.
Fig. 8. The adversarial MNIST images generated using non-targeted C&W attack when κ = 40. The first row and the third row are the original
images. The second row is the generated adversarial image based on the original model (classification results are as the labels below the second
row). The fourth row is the failed generation after applying our defence on the model.
Fig. 9. The adversarialMNIST images generated using targeted C&W attack when κ = 0. Images in the leftmost column are the original images.
Images in the first row are the targeted adversarial image generated based on the original model. Images in the second row are the generated
targeted adversarial image after applying our defence on the model. Classification results are as the labels below.
Fig. 10. The adversarial MNIST images generated using targeted C&W attack when κ = 40. Images in the leftmost column are the original
images. Images in the first row are the targeted adversarial image generated based on the original model. Images in the second row are the
generated targeted adversarial image after applying our defence on the model. Classification results are as the labels below.
